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tABSTRACT
Economic convergence is at the heart of European Union integration. 
The importance of this objective has not diminished over time, and it 
is especially relevant in light of the economic crisis that has exacted a 
heavy toll on EU countries and created scepticism about the merits of 
EU policies. 
We look at how economic convergence evolved in different regions 
during the crisis and assess the role played by those funds that 
are provided to the more disadvantaged regions, with the aim of 
facilitating their convergence to average EU income levels. 
We ran both an absolute and a conditional convergence analysis, 
using regional data on per capita GDP in purchasing power standard. 
We find that convergence continued during the crisis for the EU as 
a whole, although at a slower pace, but for regions in the EU14, and 
especially in the euro area, convergence appears to have stopped 
during the crisis, or even switched to a divergence path. 
We exploit features in the funds’ eligibility rules in order to construct 
a quasi-experimental framework, based on comparable treatment 
and control group of regions. We find that regional policy played an 
important role in limiting the effects of the crisis at the region level, by 
providing an important anchor for convergence in those regions that 
benefited from the funds. 
Income convergence 
during the crisis: did EU 
funds provide a buffer?
Silvia Merler (silvia.merler@bruegel.org) is an Affiliate Fellow at Bruegel.
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Introduction  
The European Union’s cohesion policy as we know it came into existence at the time of the Mediterranean 
enlargement, when the EU extended to include Spain, Portugal and Greece. The idea of cohesion policy was 
to complement the project for the completion of the single European market1. The Single European Act 
(SEA) of 1987 introduced the term ‘cohesion’. Subsequent reforms in 1988 and 1993 significantly augmented 
the size of the new structural and cohesion funds (Marzinotto 2012, Hodson 2012). 
  
In this paper, we look at how economic convergence evolved across European regions before and during the 
economic crisis. We focus on both the EU as a whole and on subgroups: the euro-area 18 (EA18, comprising 
all euro-area countries except Luxembourg), the euro-area 11 (EA11, comprising Austria, Belgium, 
Germany, Greece, Spain, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal), the EU14 (comprising 
countries in EA11 plus the UK, Denmark and Sweden), the so-called euro-area core (Austria, Belgium, 
Germany, Finland, France, Netherlands) and the so-called euro-area periphery (Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Portugal and Spain). We find that at the level of the EU as a whole, regions continued to converge during the 
crisis, while there is no statistically significant evidence of income convergence over the same period across 
regions within the EU14 and euro area 11 (EA11).  
 
On the basis of these findings, it is important to investigate the role played during the crisis by those funds 
(‘Objective 1’) that the EU provides to the more disadvantaged regions to foster their convergence to average 
EU income levels. The rationale and functioning of structural funds have been subject to criticism, which we 
review. Assessing the link between structural funds and convergence is complicated because these funds by 
definition go to relatively backward regions. Economic theory predicts that capital should flow downhill, 
implying we should expect these areas to be recipients of capital. We exploit the rules determining 
convergence fund eligibility to construct a treatment/control framework based on two groups of comparable 
regions. We find that during the crisis those NUTS3 regions that were eligible for Objective 1 funds grew 
faster than the other comparable regions. We also find evidence of income convergence within this group, 
meaning that among those regions that received funds, per capita income in the relatively poorer regions 
grew faster or decreased less fast. The effect is stronger for the EU14, EA11 and especially for the so-called 
euro-area periphery, than for the EU as a whole. This suggests that convergence funds played an important 
role during the crisis, at least within the group of disadvantaged regions that were entitled to receive them, 
and especially in comparison to equally disadvantaged regions that were not.  
 
These findings have important policy implications. The European Commission acknowledged the potential 
for cohesion policy to play a part in the European Economic Recovery Plan2 and to help regions and member 
states tackle the extraordinary challenges brought on by the crisis. After 2008, the Commission proposed a 
series of initiatives to speed up the implementation of European cohesion policy programmes for the 2007-
2013 period and to ensure that resources were fully mobilised3. That notwithstanding, in 2011 the main 
recipients of EU structural and cohesion funds still had to absorb considerable proportions of the amounts 
earmarked to them. Marzinotto (2011) argued that the debate on the European crisis was paying insufficient 
attention to the possible use of structural and cohesion funds for crisis management and resolution, in 
particular to compensate for the recessionary impact of fiscal consolidation and to preserve essential public 
investment in infrastructure, human capital and research. Faucher (2014) argued that cohesion policy was 
particularly important in offsetting lower public investment, showing that in 2013, the contribution of EU 
cohesion funds to public investment in regions was nine times higher than in 2007.  
 
Over the years, EU cohesion policy has not been immune to criticism, with academics and policymakers 
often questioning its rationale, organisation and effectiveness (Manzella et al, 2009).  Our results suggest that 
regional policy has played an important role in counteracting the effects of the crisis at the regional level, by 
providing an anchor for income convergence in those regions that benefitted from the funds. The effect is 
                                                 
1 The Treaty establishing the European Community defines economic and social cohesion as one of the 
priorities of the Union. Cohesion Policy should “promote economic and social progress as well as a high level of 
employment, and achieve balanced and sustainable development” (Art.2). The Community should in particular aim “to 
reduce the disparities between the levels of development of the different regions and the backwardness of the least favoured 
regions” (Art. 158). 
2 See http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=89&langId=en&newsId=422&furtherNews=yes.  
3 See http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/archive/funds/recovery/index_en.htm and 
http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=en&catId=736.  
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especially strong in those countries that were hit harder by the crisis and underwent macroeconomic 
adjustment programmes, possibly because of the tighter financial constraints that these regions had to face 
during the crisis. This is certainly a positive message, particularly relevant at a time when EU policies face 
stark criticism and Europeans seem to be growing disenchanted with the EU, which is often blamed for 
increasing rather than healing economic malaise at the domestic level.  
 
Regional economic convergence during the crisis 
Literature review 
The empirical analysis of income convergence relies on work from the early 1990s by Barro and Sala-i-
Martin, who proposed a growth equation derived from the transition path of the neoclassical growth model. 
The concept of convergence that stems from this approach is known as β-convergence, and it relates to the 
prediction that relatively poorer economies should grow faster than relatively richer ones. A variation on this 
theme predicts conditional β-convergence, which allows for different steady state levels of output in 
different countries. 
  
The literature on convergence is abundant, in the European context, and results are sometimes 
contradictory. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) did the groundwork and studied convergence across 48 US 
states using data on personal income since 1840 and data on state GDP since 1963 and up to the late 1980s. 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991) looked at patterns of convergence for 73 regions of western Europe since 
1950, finding that the process of convergence within European countries is similar to that for the United 
States, and in particular that the rate of convergence for European regions is also about 2 percent a year. 
Sala-i-Martin (1995) extended the empirical evidence on regional convergence to the US, Japan and five 
European countries, finding that the estimated speed of convergence was similar in different countries at the 
regional level and also that the interregional distribution of income shrank in all countries over time. Yin et 
al (2003) estimated both beta and sigma convergence using EU data for the period 1960-95, finding evidence 
of economic convergence within the EU except for the 1980-85 sub-period where weak divergence was 
indicated.  
 
More recently, Eckey and Türk (2007) provided a review of studies testing for sigma and beta convergence at 
the country or regional levels. The early literature detects beta convergence among EU regions, at both EU15 
and EU27 level, with the speed of convergence being rather low in the 1980s and higher afterwards. Kutan et 
al (2007) showed that EU integration is associated with an increased pace of overall growth because of 
capital accumulation. Their findings point to cohesion and structural funds playing an important role in 
helping the countries that joined the EU in 2004 and after to catch up with the older members’ standards of 
living. Böwer et al (2010) investigated the accession-related economic boom in EU countries that joined the 
EU in 2004 and after. They found that the period of EU accession is characterised by significantly larger 
growth rates of per-capita GDP, even after controlling for a wide range of economic and institutional factors. 
This effect is robust and particularly strong for countries with relatively low initial income levels, weak 
institutional quality and lower financial development, suggesting that EU accession speeds up the catching-
up process and improves the institutions of the laggards among EU joiners. Morgese Borys et al (2008) also 
focused on real convergence in candidate and potential candidate countries. They found evidence of 
conditional convergence in the transition countries of central, eastern and south-eastern Europe, controlling 
for the quality of institutions, the extent of market reforms and macroeconomic policies.  
 
Próchniak et al (2013) analysed the time stability of GDP beta convergence in the EU27 from 1993–2010 and 
EU15 from 1972–2010. They found that EU27 countries converged at the rate of about 5 percent per annum 
and EU15 countries at 3 percent. Campos et al (2014) presented estimates of the benefits from economic and 
political integration. Using the synthetic counterfactuals method, they estimated how GDP per capita and 
labour productivity would have behaved for the countries that joined the EU in the 1973, 1980s, 1995 and 
2004 enlargements, if those countries had not joined. They find large positive effects from EU membership 
but these differ for different countries and over time. Darvas (2011) assessed the impact of the 2008–09 global 
financial and economic crisis on the medium-term growth prospects of the countries of central and eastern 
Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia. Using cross-country growth regressions, he found that the crisis had 
a major impact on the within-sample fit of the models used, and that the positive impact of EU enlargement 
on growth is less than shown by previous research. The crisis is found to have altered the future growth 
prospects of the countries studied, even in the case of a return to pre-crisis capital inflows and credit booms.  
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Kaitila (2013) found a long-term trend of GDP per capita convergence in the EU after 1960 and argued that 
the Great Recession was a shock to convergence, particularly affecting the EU15. Wunsch (2013) described 
European economic convergence before the crisis as a success story with many caveats, particularly because 
of the different evolution of convergence at country level versus convergence at regional level. Faucher 
(2014) found a reversal of the convergence trend in Europe during the crisis, leading to the wealth disparities 
between regions in 2013 returning to the level observed in 2000. ECB (2015) found that while central and 
eastern European countries have caught up to the EU average over the past 15 years, real convergence 
among EA12 countries has been disappointing. Collado and Goedemé (2016) look at changes between 2005 
and 2011 in the lowest household incomes in relation to the EU-wide median, for both the EU15 and 
countries that joined the EU in 2004 and after. They show that overall the convergence machine seemed to 
work well for the lowest incomes in the joiners, but not so much for those living in the EU15.  
 
Testing regional convergence during the crisis 
Before assessing the performance of structural funds in promoting convergence, we run a simple test for the 
existence of beta convergence in the EU at NUTS24 region level during the crisis. Following Barro and Sala-i-
Martin (1992) we define the average growth rate of income over the interval between any two points in time 
t0 and t0 + T as: 
 
 
 
Where  is the initial level of Purchasing Power Standard (PPS) per capita GDP in country i, and  
is the PPS per capita GDP in country i after T years. It is customary to use PPS per capita GDP as the 
reference variable for cross-section convergence analysis, because it allows all the differences in price levels 
between countries to be catered for. By using purchasing power parities (PPPs) rather than market exchange 
rates, GDP indicators are converted into an artificial common currency, which makes it possible to compare 
purchasing power in different regions of EU countries that use different currencies and where price levels are 
different5. For simplicity, we present the result from estimating the simpler linear specification below 
(equation b), where intuitively a negative estimated beta coefficient will provide evidence of beta 
convergence6. We use data on per capita PPS GDP for more than 200 EU NUTS2 regions from 2000-147 8.  
 
 
 
When considering the EU as a whole, regions display absolute beta convergence at an estimated pace of 2 
percent per year from 2000-14 (Table 1). When looking at EU14 or EA11, no significant convergence is 
detected over the whole period. The reason for this becomes clear when breaking the time series into sub-
periods. From 2000-07, all three groups show very significant evidence of convergence, faster in the EU as a 
whole than in the EU14 and EA11. When looking at the period 2007-14, however, we find statistically 
significant evidence of divergence for both the EU14 and EA11, at a rate of about 1.4 percent per year. In 
EA11 and EU14 regions, the rate of divergence observed during the crisis is close to the rate of convergence 
observed before. At the level of the EU as a whole, by contrast, regions continued to converge during the 
crisis. 
                                                 
4 The NUTS classification (Nomenclature of territorial units for statistics) is a hierarchical system for dividing up the 
economic territory of the EU. NUTS1 refer to the major socio-economic regions; NUTS2 refer to the basic regions for 
the application of regional policies and NUTS3 refer to small regions for specific diagnoses. 
5 See Eurostat at http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/GDP_at_regional_level.  
6 The non-linear specification gives consistent results, with the coefficients being slightly larger.   
7 While earlier regional data is available on demand from Eurostat, the fact that the statistical classification system 
(ESA) was changed in 1995 and in 2000 could potentially give rise to statistical breaks and bias convergence estimates. 
Regional data for the 2000-14 period is internally consistent from a statistical point of view and is complete. 
8 In all specifications, we exclude Luxembourg because it is a significant outlier in terms of per capita income 
measures, and Croatia, as the country only entered the EU in 2013 and our data ends in 2014. Notice that some 
countries have only one region, ie, Estonia, Cyprus, Malta, Lithuania and Latvia. They are included, but excluding them 
would not change the results. 
5  
Table 1– estimated absolute beta convergence coefficients at the regional level 
 
  linear OLS 
  EA11 EU14 EA18 EU 
      
2000-2014 
.0003 .0006 -.0121***  -.022*** 
[.0026] [.0021] [.0027] [.0015] 
      
2000-2007 
-.0154*** -.0136*** -.0282*** -.0275*** 
[.0031] [.0025] [.0032] [.00183] 
      
2007-2014 
.0148*** .0137*** .0071 -.0177*** 
[.0049] [.0039] [.0046] [.0026] 
 
Note: standard errors in brackets; *** equals significance at the 1percent level, ** at 5percent, * at 10percent 
 
To check the robustness of these results, we also performed a conditional convergence analysis for EU 
regions. Table 2 presents the results of our linear specification when some important regional characteristics 
are explicitly controlled for. Many obvious control variables are not available at the regional level. We 
include population growth, R&D expenditure as percentage of GDP and the initial share of industry in 
regional value added. We find confirmation of strong and statistically significant convergence in the order of 
2 percent for the EU and the EA18 over the full period, and not for the EU14 and EA11. As in the 
unconditional analysis, convergence is strong and statistically significant for all four groups in the pre-crisis 
period. After 2007, the coefficient switches sign to positive in the EU14 and EA11, although it is no longer 
significant when conditioning to these few regional characteristics.  
 
Population growth tends to be significant and negatively correlated to per capita GDP growth, as the 
neoclassical growth theory would predict, with the exception of the EU14 and EA11 in the pre-crisis period. 
R&D expenditure positively and strongly correlates with growth over the entire period and during the crisis 
period, while it is not a significant explanatory variable in the pre-crisis period. This seems to suggest that 
investment in research and development tends to pay off more in crisis time, because it increases growth, all 
else being equal. The initial share of industry in regional value added tends not to be significant, but for the 
EU as a whole and the EA18 in the crisis period. This interestingly suggests that within these groups, those 
regions that were more industrialised at the beginning of the period fared relatively better during the crisis. 
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Table 2 – estimated conditional beta convergence at the regional level 
 
Note 1: standard errors in brackets; *** equals significance at the 1percent level, ** at 5percent, * at 
10percent  
 
Note 2: EA11 refers to Austria, Belgium, Germany, Finland, France, Netherlands, Ireland, Greece, 
Italy, Portugal and Spain. EU 14 refers to EA11 plus Denmark, Sweden and UK. EA18 refers to 
 
Cohesion policy rationale and criticisms 
EU cohesion policy has not been immune from criticism. Marzinotto (2012) reviewed how the objectives of 
this policy and the EU’s approach to it have evolved over time. In the 1970s, when the European common 
market remained highly fragmented, the underlying theoretical framework was the neoclassical growth 
model, combined with the technological gap literature. Both strands of literature led to the expectation that 
poorer countries should grow faster than richer ones. The neoclassical model predicts that capital would 
flow downhill to poor regions, because decreasing returns to capital imply that investment would be more 
remunerative where the capital stock was low. The technological gap literature expects poor regions to grow 
faster because of technology imitation rather than innovation. Persisting market fragmentation in the EU 
seemed to be consistent with Lucas’ argument that frictions may exist that prevented capital from flowing 
downhill, thus potentially preventing the poorer regions from catching-up. The late 1980s were associated 
with a paradigm shift in the understanding of growth dynamics and in the appreciation of regional policies 
(Marzinotto 2012). Cohesion policy came into existence in 1988 shortly after the Mediterranean 
enlargement, with the objective of complementing the creation of the single European market. Cohesion 
policy resonated with the ideas of endogenous growth theory and new economic geography, according to 
which free markets would generate agglomeration effects and increase income disparities, because 
economic activities would concentrate in ‘core’ technologically advanced areas. Based on these grounds, EU 
cohesion policy aims to create the conditions for increased returns on investment in poorer areas in order to 
promote endogenously their convergence to average income levels. However, the policy’s rationale, 
governance and effectiveness have faced substantial criticisms. Key criticisms are that cohesion policy has 
evolved into a ‘catch-all’ policy without a clear mission; that it insufficiently focuses on growth; that is has 
inadequate policy instruments; and that it is excessively complex and bureaucratic to administer9. The 
                                                 
9 See Manzella (2009) for a comprehensive review of the criticism. 
 2000-2014 2000-2007 2007-2014 
  EU EA18 EU14 EA11 EU EA18 EU14 EA11 EU EA18 EU14 EA11 
                
Initial 
income 
-.024*** -.017*** -.003 -.003 -.031*** -.034*** -.019*** -.019*** -.019*** -.002 .004 .004 
 [.0020]  [.0030]  [.0024]  [.0027] [.0027]  [.0042]  [.0033]  [.0040]  [.0029]  [.0044]  [.0041]  [.0047] 
                
R&D 
expenditu
re 
.253*** .216*** .188*** .230*** .162 .084 .078 .099 .359*** .372*** .364*** .425*** 
 [.0711]  [.0811]  [.0486]  [.0600]  [.1008] [.1196]  [.0689] [.0927]  [.0790]  [.0898]  [.0690]  [.0863] 
                
Populatio
n growth 
-.030*** -.032*** -.028*** -.025*** .014 .020 .052*** .056*** -.097*** -.095*** -.107*** -.097*** 
 [.0096]  [.0100] [.0069]  [.0076] [.0229]  [.0235]  [.0164] [.0185]  [.0242]  [.0275]  [.0247]  [.0281] 
                 
Initial 
industry 
share VA 
.012 .021* .006 .009 .004 .022 .013 .013 .036*** .029** .018 .018 
 [.0095]  [.0112]  [.0075]  [.0086] [.0134]  [.0159]  [.0105]  [.0127]  [.0117] [.0147]  [.0129]  [.0151] 
                 
R2 0.61 0.36 0.22 0.27 0.49 0.36 0.18 0.18 0.43 0.31 0.32 0.35 
Obs. 228 142 174 133 226 140 172 131 248 155 194 146 
7  
apparent difficulty of pinning down the economic effectiveness of cohesion policy – evident in the wide 
range of results reported in the literature – is obviously central to much of the criticism10. In this paper we 
focus on convergence funds, and assess whether they have been effective in helping income convergence in 
the least developed regions. A proper identification strategy is key to this question: convergence funds by 
their construction go to less-developed regions – making it complex to disentangle their specific impact on 
growth.   
 
Convergence funds framework in the EU during the crisis 
One of the objectives of EU cohesion policy is to reduce the gap in the levels of development of different 
regions, in order to strengthen economic and social cohesion. To this end, the so-called Objective 1 funds 
are allocated to those NUTS2 regions where per capita GDP in purchasing power standard (PPS) is below 75 
percent of the EU average.  
 
The structure of cohesion policy for 2007-13 was changed compared to the previous years. In the 2000-06 
period, cohesion policy was organised around four objectives and six instruments. For 2007-13, the 
architecture was simplified and was based on three objectives and three instruments (see European 
Commission, 2007). The three new objectives incorporate the missions of the previous Objectives 1, 2 and 3 
and the previous Community initiatives Interreg III, Equal and Urban II. ‘Objective 2’ (ie economic and 
social conversion zones) and ‘Objective 3’ (ie training systems and employment policies) were combined 
into a single ‘regional competitiveness and employment’ objective. Objective 1 (ie regions lagging behind in 
development terms) was renamed the ‘convergence’ objective, which was to stimulate growth and 
employment in the least-developed regions. The EU’s financial perspectives for 2007-13 allocated €347 
billion (35.7 percent of the EU budget) to the structural and cohesion funds. Roughly 80 percent of this was 
allocated to the convergence objective (Hodson, 2012). 
 
Table 3 – Eligibility for Convergence Funds 
 Eligibility for the Convergence Objective – regional level  
O
bj
ec
ti
ve
 1
 
2000 – 2006 >>> 2007 – 2013  
 
NUTS 2 regions whose per capita 
GDP is less than 75 percent of 
Community average. 
 
 
Transitional support for regions 
and areas which were eligible for 
1994–99, but in 2000–06 are no 
longer eligible for Objective 1 
(phasing-out) 
 
 
>>> 
 
 
 
 
 
>>> 
 
No change 
 
 
 
Tapering transitional support up to 2013 
for regions who would have been 
eligible for the convergence objective if 
the threshold had remained 75 percent 
of the average GDP of the EU-15 and not 
the EU-25. 
C
on
ve
rg
en
ce
 
 
Source: EC (2007) 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 See Manzella (2009) for a comprehensive review.  
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Table 4 – Eligibility for Cohesion Funds 
 Eligibility for the Convergence Objective – State level  
C
oh
es
io
n
 F
un
ds
 
2000 – 2006 >>> 2007 – 2013  
 
Member States whose per capita 
gross national income (GNI) is 
below 90 percent of 
the Community average 
 
 
 
 
 
>>> 
 
No change 
 
 
Tapering transitional support for 
Member States who would have been 
eligible for the Cohesion Fund objective 
if the threshold had remained 90 
percent of average GNI of EU-15 and not 
EU-25 
C
on
ve
rg
en
ce
 
 
Source: EC (2007) 
 
The newly defined convergence objective combined the Objective 1 (eligibility for which is determined at the 
regional level) and the cohesion fund (eligibility for which is determined at the national level), which no 
longer functioned independently. Regions were eligible for Objective 1 funding if their per capita gross 
domestic product (GDP) was less than 75 percent of the EU average; member states were eligible for 
cohesion fund money if their per capita gross national income (GNI) was below 90 percent of the EU 
average. Both schemes foresaw transitional support for those regions that would have been eligible based on 
the pre-enlargement benchmarks.  
 
Identification strategy: formal eligibility 
To assess the impact of structural funds on regional income convergence during the crisis, we focus on the 
Objective 1 component of the convergence funds allocation, ie the part whose eligibility is determined at the 
regional level. As convincingly pointed out by Becker et al (2008), the way these funds are allocated 
resembles a quasi-experimental setting that can be exploited for empirical investigation. Eligibility for 
Objective 1 funds is determined at the regional NUTS2 level. More specifically, NUTS2 regions were 
considered eligible for funds for the 2007-13 allocation period if their GDP per capita, measured in 
purchasing power parities and calculated on the basis of figures for the period 2000 to 2002, was less than 75 
percent of EU average GDP for the same reference period (European Commission, 200611). 
 
This rule creates a threshold: NUTS2 regions below 75 percent are entitled to the funds, while regions above 
are not. This rule is exogenous from the perspective of the smaller NUTS3 regions that belong to a certain 
NUTS2 region (Becker et al, 2008). As a result, it is perfectly possible that some NUTS3 regions in eligible 
NUTS2 areas have a per-capita GDP level higher than the threshold for eligibility at the NUTS2 level. These 
NUTS3 regions would not qualify to receive Objective 1 transfers if they had been assessed as independent 
entities, but in practice they qualify, because they are part of a relatively poor NUTS2 region. Similarly, some 
NUTS3 areas might be below the threshold if looked at individually, but the fact of belonging to a relatively 
rich NUTS2 region renders them ineligible for Objective 1 funds. We exploit this feature of the funds’ 
allocation to understand the relationship between funds and convergence during the crisis.  
 
Structural funds are allocated over a multiannual horizon. We focus on the allocation for the period 2007-13 
and look at how formal eligibility for funds relates to the growth rate of per capita GDP between 2006 and 
2013. We choose 2006 as the initial year, as this is the year before the start of the 2007-13 allocation period. 
We collect data on per capita GDP in PPS for more than 1300 NUTS3 regions12 from 2006-13 and construct a 
                                                 
11 See Chapter III, Article 5 of the General Regulation (EC 2006) 
12 We excluded some of the regions in the list because it was not possible to perfectly match them with the 
NUTS 2010 regional classification, in which the denomination and classification of some regions appears 
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dummy that equals 1 for all NUTS3 regions that were formally declared eligible for Objective 1 funds over the 
period. As previously pointed out, a NUTS3 region is formally eligible if its parent NUTS2 is eligible, 
regardless of the NUTS3 region’s level of income13. We include also those regions that were deemed eligible 
for transitional Objective 1 support. The list of eligible NUTS2 regions, according to these criteria, includes 
the following territories.  
 
• Austria: Burgenland (eligible for transitional support) 
• Belgium: Province du Hainaut (eligible for transitional support) 
• Bulgaria: all territory 
• Czech Republic: Střední Čechy, Jihozápad, Severozápad, Severovýchod, Jihovýchod, Střední 
Morava, Moravskoslezsko 
• Germany: Brandenburg-Nordost, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Chemnitz, Dresden, Dessau, 
Magdeburg, Thüringen (eligible); Brandenburg-Südwest, Lüneburg, Leipzig, Halle (eligible for 
transitional support only) 
• Estonia: all territory 
• Greece: Anatoliki Makedonia, Thraki, Thessalia, Ipeiros, Ionia Nisia, Dytiki Ellada, Peloponnisos, 
Voreio Aigaio, Kriti (eligible); Kentriki Makedonia, Dytiki Makedonia, Attiki (eligible for transitional 
support only) 
• Spain: Galicia, Castilla-La Mancha, Extremadura, Andalucía (eligible); Principado de Asturias, 
Región de Murcia, Ciudad Autónoma de Ceuta, Ciudad Autónoma de Melilla (eligible for 
transitional support only) 
• France: Guadeloupe, Martinique, Guyane, Réunion 
• Italy: Campania, Puglia, Calabria, Sicilia (eligible); Basilicata (eligible for transitional support only) 
• Latvia: all territory 
• Lithuania: all territory 
• Hungary: Közép-Dunántúl, Nyugat-Dunántúl, Dél-Dunántúl, Észak-Magyarország, Észak-Alföld, 
Dél-Alföld 
• Malta: all territory 
• Poland: all territory 
• Portugal: Norte, Centro, Alentejo, Região Autónoma dos Açores (eligible); Algarve (eligible for 
transitional support only)) 
• Romania: all territory 
• Slovenia: all territory  
• Slovakia: Západné Slovensko, Stredné Slovensko, Východné Slovensko 
• United Kingdom: Cornwall and Isles of Scilly, West Wales and the Valleys (eligible); Highlands and 
Islands (eligible for transitional support only) 
 
We then regress the 2006-13 growth rate of per capita PPS GDP on both the eligibility dummy and its 
interaction with the initial (ie 2006) income level. This specification allows us to assess the link between 
formal eligibility for Objective 1 funds and growth, but also to understand whether income levels in the 
formally eligible regions converged. We include country fixed effects, to control for potential factors 
common to all regions. Table 5 reports the results. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
to have changed. This left us initially with 1319 regions, but for 18 of them the per capita PPS GDP is 
missing in either 2006 or 2013, so they are dropped from the regression. 
13 The list of the eligible NUTS2 is available in ‘European Union, Cohesion Policy 2007-13, Commentary 
to the official texts’.  
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 Table 5 – objective 1 eligibility and convergence at NUTS3 level 
  EU EA EU14 EA11 EA Core EA Periphery 
       
Formal dummy 
.092*** .212***  .219*** .236*** .238*** .249*** 
[.0193] [.0281] [.0322] [.0336] [.0499] [.0445] 
       
Formal * ln_Y0 
-.009*** -.021*** -.022*** -.024*** -.024*** -.025*** 
[.0020] [.0029] [.0033] [.0034] [.0051] [.0045] 
       
R2 0.76 0.67 0.67 0.64 0.31 0.57 
obs. 1301 920 1081 876 640 236 
n° formal=1 / formal=0 427/874 239/681 212/869 197/679 87/553 110/126 
country FE yes yes yes yes yes yes 
 
Note: EA Core includes Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany and the Netherlands; EA Periphery 
includes Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. 
 
The coefficient of the formal eligibility dummy is positive and significant at the EU level, suggesting that 
during the crisis period eligibility for structural funds was associated with higher growth. The result is valid 
for the euro area, EU14, EA11 and euro-area core and periphery, and interestingly the effect is greater at the 
EA11 level, especially for the euro-area periphery that includes all the countries undergoing EU/IMF 
macroeconomic adjustment programmes plus Italy. It is also consistent with previous evidence. For 
example, Cappelen et al (2003) find that EU regional support has a significant and positive impact on the 
growth performance of European regions, much stronger in more developed environments. The coefficient 
on the interaction term is negative, meaning that among those regions that were formally eligible for 
Objective 1 funds, income in the relatively poorer regions grew faster (or decreased less fast). For the euro 
area, this suggests that even during the crisis, those NUTS3 regions that were formally eligible for 
convergence aid kept converging, at a rate of about 2 percent per year14.  
 
Identification strategy: a treatment/control framework 
To better assess the role of Objective 1 funds in fostering convergence, we use the NUTS3 data to mimic a 
treatment/control framework, exploiting the previously described rule for convergence funds eligibility.  
 
First, we apply to each NUTS3 region the eligibility criteria that is normally applied to NUTS2 regions, ie we 
check whether each NUTS3 individual income is above or below the 75 percent of EU average benchmark15. 
We identify all those NUTS3 regions that would be eligible if the threshold were applied to their individual 
income rather than that of their parent NUTS2 region.  
 
Second, we match this ‘actual’ measure of eligibility with the ‘formal’ eligibility status of the same NUTS3 
regions. This allows us to identify two sub-groups of regions: one group includes those NUTS3 regions that 
would be eligible based on their individual income and were also formally eligible based on their parent 
NUTS2 income; a second group includes those NUTS3 region that would be eligible based on their 
individual income but were not deemed formally eligible based on their parent NUTS2’s level of income. We 
can think of these two groups as a treatment and control group: regions in both groups have an individual 
income level that is below 75 percent of the EU average, but depending on their NUTS2 parent’s income 
some of them have been treated (ie deemed eligible for convergence funds) while others have not. Table 6 
                                                 
14 This result is robust to the inclusion of NUTS2-level fixed effects instead of country fixed effects. 
15 More specifically, NUTS3 regions were considered eligible for funds for the 2007-13 allocation period if 
their GDP per capita, measured in purchasing power parities and calculated on the basis of Community 
figures for the period 2000 to 2002, was less than 75 percent of the average GDP of the EU25 for the 
same reference period. This is the formal criteria used for NUTS2 regions and detailed in European 
Commission (2006). 
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shows a comparison of formal eligibility with our measure of actual eligibility for some NUTS3 regions in 
different countries. 
 
Table 6 – actual vs. formal eligibility examples 
region 
Benchmark  
(2000-02 avg. per capita 
PPS GDP as percent  
EU25) 
actual NUTS3 
eligibility 
formal 
NUTS3 
eligibility 
    
NUTS2: DE80 - Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 79 no yes 
NUTS3: DE803 - Rostock, Kreisfreie Stadt 113 no yes 
NUTS3: DE804 - Schwerin, Kreisfreie Stadt 120 no yes 
NUTS3: DE80J - Mecklenburgische Seenplatte 81 no yes 
NUTS3: DE80K - Landkreis Rostock 74 yes yes 
NUTS3: DE80L - Vorpommern-Rügen 69 yes yes 
NUTS3: DE80M - Nordwestmecklenburg 67 yes yes 
NUTS3: DE80N - Vorpommern-Greifswald 68 yes yes 
NUTS3: DE80O - Ludwigslust-Parchim 66 yes yes 
        
NUTS2: ES11 - Galicia 80 no yes 
NUTS3: ES111 - A Coruña 82 no yes 
NUTS3: ES112 - Lugo 76 no yes 
NUTS3: ES113 - Ourense 74 yes yes 
NUTS3: ES114 - Pontevedra 80 no yes 
        
NUTS2: ITG2 - Sardegna 87 no no 
NUTS3: ITG25 - Sassari 83 no no 
NUTS3: ITG26 - Nuoro 86 no no 
NUTS3: ITG27 - Cagliari 101 no no 
NUTS3: ITG28 - Oristano 81 no no 
NUTS3: ITG29 - Olbia-Tempio 90 no no 
NUTS3: ITG2A - Ogliastra 69 yes no 
NUTS3: ITG2B - Medio Campidano 62 yes no 
NUTS3: ITG2C - Carbonia-Iglesias 71 yes no 
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We restrict the sample to these two group of regions, and look at how the ‘treatment’ group fared compared 
to the control. While this is not a proper randomised treatment/control framework, the regions in the two 
groups are all in the same low income bracket and are expected to share comparable traits. From their 
perspective, treatment is random, because it depends on their parent region’s income level, which NUTS3 
regions cannot directly influence. So this framework offers a good chance to understand whether the results 
in Table 5 are robust to a stricter definition of the sample. Table 7 below show the results.  
 
Table 7 – Convergence at NUTS3 level – Treatment and control group 
  EU EA EU14 EA11 EA Core EA Periphery 
       
Treatment 
.060** .241*** .444** .460*** .172 .636*** 
[.0262] [.0435] [.0899] [.0908] [.1498] [.1077] 
       
Treatment. * ln_Y0 
-.006** -.025*** -.046*** -.047***  -.018 -.066*** 
[.0027] [.0045] [.0093] [.0094] [.0155] [.0111] 
       
R2 0.80 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.23 0.83 
obs. 347 170 139 133 78 55 
n° in T = 1 / C = 1 303/44 128/42 96/43 91/42 43/35 48/7 
country FE yes yes yes yes yes yes 
 
The sign and significance on the ‘treatment’ dummy suggests that those NUTS3 regions that qualified for 
funds based on their own level of income, and that were also deemed eligible, grew faster than those NUTS3 
regions that had a comparable level of income but were not deemed eligible for funds (consistent with what 
Becker et al, 2008, find for the 2000-06 period). The effect is particularly strong at the level of the EA11 and 
particularly in the euro-area periphery. The sign and significance of the interaction term suggests that 
among those regions that were ‘treated’, per capita income in poorer regions grew faster (or decreased less 
fast). The estimated pace of convergence varies among groups but it is especially strong for the EA11 and the 
euro-area periphery, while no significant effect is detected for regions in the euro-area core, which were less 
affected by the crisis. 
 
Conclusion and policy discussion 
Economic convergence is at the heart of European economic integration. Cohesion policy was born in the 
1980s with the aim of complementing the creation of a single European market and fostering the economic 
development of less advantaged EU regions. The importance of this objective has not diminished over time, 
and it is especially relevant in light of the economic crisis that has exacted a heavy toll on many EU countries 
and regions.  
 
In this paper, we looked at how economic convergence evolved across European regions before and during 
the economic crisis. We ran both an absolute and a conditional convergence analysis, using regional data on 
per capita GDP in purchasing power standard. We find that convergence continued during the crisis for the 
EU as a whole, although at a slower pace, but for regions in the EU14, and especially in the euro area, 
convergence appears to have stopped during the crisis, or even switched to a divergence path.  
 
In light of this evidence, we looked at the relationship between Objective 1 convergence funds (aimed at 
fostering regional convergence) and per capita income growth, during the crisis. Exploiting the quasi-
experimental features of the rules determining eligibility for these funds, we find that during the crisis those 
NUTS3 regions that were formally eligible for Objective 1 funds grew faster than the others, and we also find 
evidence of income convergence within this group, at a pace of 2 percent per year. The effect is especially 
strong for the EA11, and comparable in magnitude across the euro-area core and periphery.  
 
We then restricted the sample to a treatment and control group, which we identified assessing each NUTS3 
region’s individual income level against the benchmark used at the NUTS2 level to determine eligibility for 
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Objective 1 funds. These two groups share a comparable level of income but differ in their treatment status. 
When restricting the sample to these groups, we find again a positive link between structural funds and 
growth in the treated regions compared to the control group, and the effect is greater than for the full 
sample. We also find evidence of income convergence among the treated regions. The results are stronger 
still for the EU14 and EA11 than for the EU as a whole, and they are especially strong for the euro-area 
periphery. On the contrary, no statistically significant effect is detected for regions in the so-called euro-area 
core.  
 
The model we estimate is very simple. A more comprehensive assessment of the effectiveness of EU 
cohesion policy with respect to its stated objectives would probably need to encompass other factors. It 
would be important to look at the actual absorption of the funds (Tosun, 2013), and the extent to which EU 
funds have been truly able to enhance the marginal product of capital (Marzinotto, 2012) or the extent to 
which they have long-term political impacts (Huliara et al, 2016). Research also suggests that the allocation 
of structural funds is is subject to intense bargaining between national governments and across layers of 
political governance (Bouvet et al, 2013) and that political factors and/or electoral institutions might bias the 
domestic allocation of the funds in ways that might not be in line with EU goals (Dellmuth et al, 2016). 
 
This notwithstanding, the evidence presented in this paper is very relevant from a policy perspective. It 
suggests that convergence funds did play an important role in helping income convergence during a time of 
crisis, within the group of disadvantaged regions that were entitled to receive the funds, and especially in 
comparison to equally disadvantaged regions that were not eligible. This holds not only at the EU level, but 
also within the EU14 and EA11, for which we do not find evidence of convergence when running our 
absolute and conditional convergence analysis for all regions, without distinguishing for their eligibility for 
funds. Moreover, the effect appears to be especially strong for regions in those euro-area countries that were 
hardest hit by the crisis and/or underwent EU/IMF macroeconomic adjustment programmes, suggesting 
that the role of convergence in counteracting the effect of the crisis on growth and economic convergence 
was particularly important there, possibly because of the harder financial constraints that regions in those 
countries were facing. At a time when the merit of EU policies is often criticised, and Europeans are 
increasingly sceptical of the domestic economic implications of EU membership, this is a very relevant 
message.  
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A11 plus Cyprus, Malta, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Slovakia.  
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